UCLA Football: What Is Wrong With UCLA? Are They Quitting?

Talking Point #1: UCLA switched from Mazzone’s offense to a pro-style to run the ball more. Reality: That’s HOGWASH

UCLA was largely a run first offense under Mazzone, but in 2015 the running attack became one-dimensional because Rosen did not have enough carries to keep the defense honest. The fast pace offense also had very few contingencies for extra pass-protection, and without a strong running QB to help keep the offense efficient, the Bruin defense was often left out to dry last year (which was compounded by a slew of defensive injuries).

Mora and Mazzone parted ways amicably in the off-season because the Mazzone offense (which was perfectly suited to Brett Hundley and his strong legs) did not fit with the college version of Josh Rosen. Based on the chart below, its clear that the N-zone offense is more balanced then people give it credit for, but it just wasn’t quite right for Rosen.

The only year that Mazzone called fewer runs then passes was last year with a non-running Rosen. He may have run an option system in high school, but the lack of a back-up QB (the #2’s under Rosen have been career backup Jerry Neuheisel and walk-on Mike Fafaul) and likely his NFL aspirations created an urgency to keep Rosen on his feet.

Running the option was not an option for Mora and Rosen, because you don’t expose talents like Rosen to decapitation at the hands of opposing defenses.

As the option read handoff was a key element in at least four of the six total plays in the streamlined Mazzone offense, and because Mazzone’s scheme often left free rushers with easy shots at the QB, the system that worked so well for Hundley was not suited to take advantage of Rosen’s talents.

Related Story: What Happens With Rosen Out Indefinitely?

The Bruins also made the switch from the spread and hurry N-zone offense as a favor to their defense. UCLA had a pretty efficient offense in the Hundley years, but in Rosen’s first year it was more boom and bust. After never falling below 29 minutes per game in Time of Possesion with Hundley under center, the 2105 Bruins were last in the Pac-12 in Time of Possession (behind even Air/Bear Raid teams Washington State and Cal). The 2015 offense would either have a spectacular 5 play drive for a touchdown or a 3 and out; either way, they were not able to stay on the field long enough.

The switch was also an effort to get the short yardage game going again. With Hundley under center, the Bruins had the knowledge that Hundley could run for a few yards at any moment as a security blanket. Over the years, they also had great backs like Johnathan Franklin and Paul Perkins to get tough yards, and they also discovered wrecking ball phenom Myles Jack halfway through 2014. The Bruins averaged at least 3 YPC on 3rd/3 or shorter from 2012 – 14 (see chart).

2015 is the only year that Mazzone’s Bruin offense failed to regularly convert 3rd and short. Once again, for all that Rosen could do, the unwillingness to run him took an important piece from the running attack and made it one dimensional. Running from under center, out of the pistol, with a full back or multiple tight ends were all supposed to be wrinkles available to the offense under the new, more diverse system.

The bottom line is that the Bruins did not change the offense so drastically to improve the run game. They changed to a more deliberate and diverse style to fit what they thought was the new strength of their team: a quarterback who could make every throw and make great decisions (as Jason Sehorn noted, the sophomore version of Rosen still has a way do go).

They did it to keep their offense on the field because of the disconnect between Rosen and the read-option. They did it to give them more options in the short yardage game that has struggled since Myles Jack went down early last year. The bonus was supposed to be that they could match up with Stanford better, but that was not the primary motivation.